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INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE 1 
Amici are law professors who specialize in 
intellectual property law and who have previously 
published on, or have interest in, the issues of willful 
infringement, patent remedies, and, more broadly, 
the proper functioning of the patent system. The 
undersigned amici have no personal stake in the 
outcome of these cases, but have an interest in 
seeing that the patent laws operate in a way that 
promotes innovation. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Section 284 of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 284, 
like its precursors, does not grant trial judges 
authority to increase damages up to three times the 
amount of actual damages for any reason. Rather, 
the statutory text has been consistently been applied 
by courts to increase damages when the infringer 
has engaged in especially wrongful infringement, 
now commonly called willfulness. Absent clear 
evidence to the contrary, the Court should conclude 
that in enacting § 284, Congress incorporated the 
settled meaning developed in over a century of case 
                                                 
1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici curiae affirm 
that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in 
part, that no counsel or a party made a monetary contribution 
intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief, 
and that no person other than amici curiae, their members, or 
their counsels made a monetary contribution to its preparation 
or submission. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.2, each 
party has consented to the filing of this brief, and copies of the 








law that increased damages2 should be awarded only 
for willfulness. This settled meaning is confirmed by 
Congress’s recent enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 298, 
which prohibits use of an accused infringer’s failure 
to obtain or present advice of counsel as evidence 
that it “willfully infringed” the patent—language 
which only makes sense if willfulness is the standard 
for increasing damages under § 284. 
Although correctly recognizing that willfulness is 
the sole basis for increasing damages under § 284, 
the current test adopted by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit for determining 
willfulness is incorrect as a matter of law. Starting 
with its en banc decision in In re Seagate 
Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007), the 
Federal Circuit abandoned its prior totality-of-the-
circumstances approach in favor of a rigid, two-part 
test that terminates the willfulness inquiry if the 
accused infringer can offer a reasonable litigation 
defense to infringement, without considering any 
evidence regarding the accused infringer’s state of 
mind. The Federal Circuit’s adoption and application 
of this rigid two-part test for determining willfulness 
conflicts with the discretionary language of § 284, 
particularly in light of this Court’s recent decisions 
in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014), and Highmark Inc. v. 
Allcare Health Management System, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
                                                 
2 For consistency with the statutory text, this brief uses 
“increased damages” in lieu of “enhanced damages.” See 35 








1744 (2014), which rejected a similarly inflexible 
approach for awarding attorney’s fees under § 285.  
In lieu of the Federal Circuit’s inflexible 
approach, this Court should hold that district courts 
should determine willfulness—and thus eligibility 
for increased damages—by requiring the patentee to 
demonstrate that the infringer at least recklessly 
violated the patentee’s rights under a totality of the 
circumstances. In addition, because willfulness is a 
fact-intensive determination best suited for 
resolution by the trial court, this decision should be 
reviewed for abuse of discretion on appeal.  
ARGUMENT 
I. Willfulness Is the Appropriate Standard for 
Determining Whether Damages Should Be 
Increased Under Section 284 
Section 284, like its precursors, allows trial 
judges to increase damages up to three times the 
amount determined to be adequate to compensate for 
the infringement. Courts have long understood that 
this authority to increase damages is used only in 
situations where the infringer engaged in egregious 
or especially wrongful infringement of a patent, a 
concept generally known as willful infringement.3 
                                                 
3 There is no reason to depart from the terminology of 
“willfulness” or to introduce slight distinctions for a word that, 
as Judge Learned Hand once observed, “always gathers an 
unhappy cloud of uncertainty that has caused an abundance of 









While the provenance of the willful infringement 
standard is well established, amici are concerned 
about suggestions that this Court condone 
alternative grounds for increasing damages under 
§ 284. Despite courts’ and commentators’ occasional 
discussion of alternate possible theories for 
increasing damages, actual reliance on those 
theories is lacking. No decision by this Court has 
ever affirmed a discretionary increase in damages, 
let alone one based on a theory other than 
willfulness. 
Thus, absent clear evidence to the contrary, the 
Court should infer that in enacting § 284, Congress 
incorporated the “settled meaning” that increased 
damages should be awarded only for willfulness. Cf. 
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 
2246 (2011) (holding that in enacting 35 U.S.C. 
§ 282, which declared a patent is “presumed valid,” 
Congress also incorporated the “settled meaning” 
from case law that a defendant raising an invalidity 
defense bore a “heightened standard of proof” for 
overcoming the presumption). This standard is part 
of the firm bedrock of patent law. 
A. The Statutory History of the Trial 
Court’s Power to Increase Damages 
Consists of a Chain of Consistent 
Statutory Language, While Courts’ 
Broader Authority to Award Monetary 
Remedies Has Changed Substantially 
Since its enactment in 1836, the statutory 
language granting trial judges the discretion to 








although the courts’ broader authorization to award 
monetary remedies has changed substantially. The 
statutory history of trial courts’ power to award 
monetary remedies actually involves two separate 
chains of statutory provisions: a first section 
applying to suits brought in actions at law, and a 
second section largely applying to suits brought in 
equity. As explained below, the statutory language 
permitting a court to award up to three times the 
amount of actual damages consistently appeared in 
the remedial provision for actions at law, which 
underwent only minor alterations between 1836 and 
1952. The court in equity’s statutory authority to 
award monetary remedies, in contrast, underwent 
several major changes over the same time. 
Prior to the 1836 Patent Act, successful patent 
holders were automatically entitled to “a sum equal 
to three times the actual damage sustained.” Act of 
Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat. 37, 38 (1800); see 
also Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64, 68-69 (1876) 
(discussing the history of the patent statutes in the 
1800s). Among the many changes in the 1836 Patent 
Act was the replacement of the mandatory trebling 
provision with permissive language. The relevant 
portion read:  
[I]t shall be in the power of the court to render 
judgment for any sum above the amount found 
by such verdict as the actual damages 
sustained by the plaintiff, not exceeding three 
times the amount thereof, according to the 








Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123 
(1836). The 1870 Patent Act contained similar 
language: 
[T]he court may enter judgment thereon for 
any sum above the amount found by the 
verdict as the actual damages sustained, 
according to the circumstances of the case, not 
exceeding three times the amount of such 
verdict, together with the costs. 
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 59, 16 Stat. 198, 207 
(1870). That language remained unchanged until 
1952, when Congress enacted now-Section 284.  
In contrast, the parallel remedial provision 
applying to suits in equity changed dramatically 
between 1836 and 1952. Section 17 of the 1836 
Patent Act provided that infringement suits could be 
brought in equity as well as law. § 17, 5 Stat. at 124. 
Although this provision referred simply to the court’s 
power to “grant injunctions[] according to the course 
and principles of courts of equity,” id., courts also 
exercised their equitable powers to award the 
infringer’s profits. Birdsall, 93 U.S. at 68-69. This 
power was codified in § 55 of the 1870 Patent Act, in 
which Congress specifically granted a court sitting in 
equity the authority to award “the profits to be 
accounted for by the defendant,” as well as “the 
damages the complainant has sustained.” § 55, 16 
Stat. at 206. Congress also granted courts sitting in 
equity “the same powers to increase the same in its 
discretion that are given by this act to increase the 
damages found by verdicts in actions upon the case,” 
id., a clear reference to the trebling power in § 59 of 








This provision underwent additional changes 
over the next eighty years that further altered the 
trial court’s authority to award monetary remedies 
while sitting in equity.4 Notably, in 1946, Congress 
eliminated language authorizing courts sitting in 
equity to award the infringer’s profits, while at the 
same time granting them discretionary authority to 
award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. Act of 
Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778, 778 (1946); see 
also Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1753. Despite 
these changes, courts continued to have the “same 
power to increase the assessed damages, in its 
discretion, as . . . in actions in the nature of actions 
of trespass upon the case”—i.e., actions at law. 60 
Stat. at 778. 
The 1952 Patent Act collapsed the two remedial 
provisions into § 284, providing separate sections for 
injunctive relief (35 U.S.C. § 283) and the award of 
attorney’s fees in “exceptional cases” (35 U.S.C. 
§ 285). Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, §§ 
283, 285, 66 Stat. 792, 812-13 (1952). The second 
paragraph of § 284 states:  
When the damages are not found by a jury, 
the court shall assess them. In either event 
the court may increase the damages up to 
three times the amount found or assessed. 
                                                 
4 These changes included a six-year limitation on profits or 
damages, Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 391, § 6, 29 Stat. 692, 694 
(1897), and authority to award “a reasonable sum as profits or 
general damages for the infringement” when “damages or 
profits are not susceptible of calculation and determination 
with reasonable certainty,” Act of Feb. 21, 1922, ch. 58, § 8, 42 








35 U.S.C. § 284 (1952). Since 1952, Congress has 
made only a single substantive change to § 284, to 
exclude provisional rights under § 154(d) from 
increased damages. See Intellectual Property and 
Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, Pub. 
L. No. 106-113, § 4504, 113 Stat. 1501A-521, 1501A-
564 (1999).  
B. While Trial Courts Have Possessed 
Statutory Discretion to Increase 
Damages Since 1836, They Have 
Consistently Limited Exercise of That 
Discretion to Instances of Willfulness  
Since the nineteenth century, courts have 
consistently limited the exercise of their discretion to 
increase damages to circumstances involving 
especially wrongful infringement. Court opinions 
have used an array of labels to express this concept. 
See, e.g., Lyon v. Donaldson, 34 F. 789, 793 
(C.C.N.D. Ill. 1888) (“flagrant violation” of patentee’s 
rights); Ford v. Kurtz, 12 F. 789, 789 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 
1882) (Harlan, J.) (“malicious” infringement); Buerk 
v. Imhaeuser, 4 F. Cas. 594, 595 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1876) 
(“wil[l]ful” infringement); Am. Nicholson Pavement 
Co. v. City of Elizabeth, 1 F. Cas. 691, 700 
(C.C.D.N.J. 1874) (“wanton” infringement); Russell 
v. Place, 21 F. Cas. 57, 58 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1871) 
(“deliberate and intentional” infringement). But each 
of these terms reflects a common meaning: that the 
infringement was especially egregious, rather than 
simply being a typical patent infringement suit. The 
well-understood modern terminology for this concept 
is willfulness, a term that encompasses bad faith 








Early case law recognized willfulness as the 
primary or sole grounds for increasing damages. The 
earliest reported case applying the increased 
damages provision appears to be Guyon v. Serrell, 11 
F. Cas. 132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1847), in which the trial 
court denied a request to increase damages where 
the defendant generally acted in good faith. Id. at 
133. Four years later, in Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 
363 (1851), this Court noted that “if, in the opinion of 
the court, the defendant has not acted in good faith, 
or has been stubbornly litigious, or has caused 
unnecessary expense and trouble to the plaintiff, the 
court may increase the amount of the verdict, to the 
extent of trebling it.” Id. at 372. In Seymour v. 
McCormick, 57 U.S. 480 (1854), the Court, reversing 
a jury award of damages, distinguished between 
actual damages and “vindictive or exemplary 
damages,” which are intended “not to recompense 
the plaintiff, but to punish the defendant” in cases 
“where the injury is wanton or malicious.” Id. at 489. 
Subsequent opinions of this Court used similar 
language. See, e.g., Teese v. Huntingdon, 64 U.S. 2, 9 
(1860) (“[I]f, in the opinion of the court, the 
defendant has not acted in good faith, or has caused 
unnecessary expense and injury to the plaintiff, the 
court may render judgment for a larger sum, not 
exceeding three times the amount of the verdict.”); 
Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697, 699, 704 (1890) 
(reviewing a decision that found infringement 
“willful, wanton, and persistent” but reversing on 
other grounds).5  
                                                 









In fact, motions to increase damages at this time 
were so unusual that more than one judge remarked 
on the rarity of such requests. See Schwarzel v. 
Holenshade, 21 F. Cas. 772, 773 (S.D. Ohio 1866) (“It 
is somewhat remarkable that in the almost countless 
reports of trials of patent right cases in the United 
States, there are so few in which the statute 
authorizing a judgment for treble damages has been 
presented for judicial consideration.”); see also 
Welling v. La Bau, 35 F. 302, 304 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1888) (“The limited number of reported cases upon 
this subject is of itself proof of the care with which 
the courts have exercised the discretion given by the 
statute.”). When patent holders did bring motions to 
increase damages, courts denied them if the 
defendant was not a willful infringer. See, e.g., Ford, 
12 F. at 789 (declining to increase damages and 
remarking “[t]he infringement by defendants of 
complainant’s patent was neither wil[l]ful nor 
malicious”); Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 1 F. Cas 
at 698 (“[T]here is nothing in the case, which 
authorizes the court, if it had the power, and were so 
disposed, to visit upon the defendants any 
consequences in the nature of a penalty. They were 
not wanton infringers.”); see also Brodie v. Ophir 
Silver Mining Co., 4 F. Cas. 202, 203-04 (C.C.D. Cal. 
                                                                                                    
claim for increased damages, Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 
174 (1892), the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision not to 
increase damages, while also suggesting that the Court itself 
would have increased them given the circumstances. Those 
circumstances fit the mold of willful infringement. None of the 
Court’s other decisions, aside from Boesch, actually involved a 








1867) (stating the power to increase damages 
“should only be exercised to remunerate parties who 
have been driven to litigation to sustain their 
patents by wanton and persistent infringement”). 
Indeed, so well established was this standard 
that in the 1890 edition of his classic treatise on 
patent law, William Robinson observed that courts 
exercised their power to increase damages 
“principally in cases of wanton infringement, or 
where the defendant has compelled the plaintiff to 
resort to needless and expensive litigation.” 3 
William C. Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful 
Inventions § 1069, at 365 (1890). Each of the cases 
cited by Robinson for this claim either denied an 
increase because the conduct was not willful or 
wanton, see, e.g., Schwarzel, 21 F. Cas. at 772-74, or 
increased damages because, for example, the 
infringement appeared “deliberate and intentional,” 
Russell, 21 F. Cas. at 58. These decisions were 
consistent with the view that the purpose of the 
increased damages provision was to address this 
specific type of activity. See, e.g., Bell v. McCullough, 
3 F. Cas. 108, 109 (S.D. Ohio 1858) (rejecting treble 
damages and observing that the “object of this 
provision was to remunerate patentees who were 
compelled to sustain their patents against wanton 
and persevering infringers”).  
Courts continued to apply a similar approach 
throughout the twentieth century. For example, in 
Van Kannel Revolving Door Co. v. Uhrich, 297 F. 
363 (8th Cir. 1924), the Eighth Circuit affirmed 
increased damages where “the defendants were 








Similarly, in Union Carbide Corp. v. Graver Tank & 
Manufacturing Co., 282 F.2d 653 (7th Cir. 1960), the 
Seventh Circuit, after extensively examining 
potential alternative rationales for increasing 
damages, concluded that “it is only on the basis of 
conscious and wil[l]ful infringement that exemplary 
or punitive damages are allowed.” Id. at 675. 
Decisions from the last fifty years relying on 
willfulness as a standard for increasing damages 
under § 284 are legion. See, e.g., Lam, Inc. v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 668 F.2d 462, 474 (10th Cir. 1982); 
Dow Chem. Co. v. Chem. Cleaning, Inc., 434 F.2d 
1212, 1214 (5th Cir. 1970); Am. Safety Table Co. v. 
Schreiber, 415 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir. 1969); see also 
John J. Pavlak, The Increasing Risk of Willful 
Patent Infringement, 65 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 603, 604 
(1983) (“Section 284 of the patent laws permits a 
court to increase damages ‘up to three times the 
amount found or assessed.’ While this statute does 
not specify the grounds for such an increase, the 
courts have historically limited increased damages to 
willful infringement.”). Since the inception of the 
Federal Circuit, willfulness has been the gold 
standard for increasing damages under § 284. See, 
e.g., Yarway Corp. v. Eur–Control USA, Inc., 775 
F.2d 268, 277 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“It is well-settled that 
enhancement of damages [under § 284] must be 
premised on willful infringement or bad faith.”).  
Similarly, this Court has repeatedly used the 
language of willfulness to define when increased 
damages could be awarded under § 284. In Aro 
Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement 








patentee “could in a case of willful or bad-faith 
infringement recover punitive or ‘increased’ damages 
under the statute’s trebling provision.” Id. at 508. 
More recently, in Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 
207 (1985), the Court, citing § 284, observed that 
“[a]mong the available remedies are treble damages 
for willful infringement.” Id. at 227 n.19 
Although commentators have occasionally 
discussed other rationales for increasing damages, 
those theories have found little purchase in actual 
decisions. For example, while the 1937 version of 
Walker on Patents proclaimed that a court could 
increase damages by awarding the infringer’s 
profits, it cited no case where that was actually 
done.6 See 3 Anthony William Deller, Walker on 
Patents § 835, at 2175 (1937). In any event, while 
awarding the infringer’s profits was a viable legal 
theory during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, the 1946 Patent Act eliminated that 
possibility. See Aro Mfg. Co., 377 U.S. at 505-06. 
The difficulty of proving damages has been 
offered as another possible rationale for increasing 
damages, see, e.g., Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1378 
(Gajarsa, J., concurring); Trio Process Corp. v. L. 
Goldstein’s Sons, Inc., 638 F.2d 662, 662-63 (3d Cir. 
1981), but such claims are complicated by the 
existence of separate authority on this point. For 
example, between 1922 and 1946, the Patent Act 
                                                 
6 The only case cited by Walker on Patents for this 
proposition involved an increase on the ground that “there was 
deliberate and willful infringement.” Sutton v. Gulf Smokeless 








expressly authorized courts to decide compensation 
when “damages or profits are not susceptible of 
calculation and determination with reasonable 
certainty.” 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1934). The text and 
structure of § 284 also suggest that damages cannot 
be increased due to proof issues. The first paragraph 
of § 284 requires an “award” of “damages adequate 
to compensate for the infringement,” which shall be 
“in no event less than a reasonable royalty.” 35 
U.S.C. § 284. Only after adequate compensatory 
damages are awarded can the court “increase” them, 
as provided in the second paragraph. Id. The 
availability of a reasonable royalty, which 
“necessarily involves an element of approximation 
and uncertainty,” Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign 
Co., 69 F.3d 512, 517 (Fed. Cir. 1995), for 
determining adequate compensation further 
undermines this claim. See Union Carbide, 282 F.2d 
at 673-75 (declining to increase damages when 
compensatory damages were calculated on a 
reasonable royalty basis). 
Some authorities also have suggested that abuse 
of the litigation process might be an alternative 
basis for increasing damages, but evidence that 
courts routinely did so is lacking. For instance, 
Robinson’s 1890 treatise referred to “needless and 
expensive litigation,” although none of his cited 
cases actually increased damages for that reason. 
See Robinson, supra, at 365. And even if abusive 
litigation tactics might once have been a valid 
rationale for increasing damages, Congress’s 
creation of a separate statutory provision to address 
such behavior in the 1952 Patent Act eliminated that 








courts to increase damages under § 284 for this 
reason would create a new, one-sided remedy for 
litigation misconduct—and there is no evidence that 
Congress intended such an outcome. Cf. Fogerty v. 
Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 523, 534 (1994) (holding 
prevailing plaintiffs and defendants in copyright 
litigation must be “treated alike” for awarding 
attorney’s fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505 because a 
contrary interpretation of the statute lacked support 
in the legislative history). 
In sum, both the evolution of the statutory text 
and its application by courts demonstrates that 
increased damages have been consistently granted 
for one reason—willful infringement. 
C. Section 298 Confirms That Willfulness 
Is the Standard for Increasing Damages 
In addition, Congress recently confirmed that 
§ 284 rests on a determination of willfulness. In 
2011, Congress added § 298 as part of the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act, which states in relevant 
part that failure to obtain or introduce advice of 
counsel “may not be used to prove that the accused 
infringer willfully infringed the patent.” 35 U.S.C. 
§ 298 (2012). This provision was intended to protect 
against waiver of attorney-client privilege in order to 
defend against a claim of willfulness under § 284 by 
offering an opinion of counsel regarding non-
infringement and/or invalidity of the asserted 
claims, a situation that commonly occurred prior to 
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH 
v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en 
banc). See Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, 








Tech. L.J. 1085, 1087-88 (2003). Section 298 also 
abrogated case law suggesting the absence of an 
opinion of counsel was relevant to determining 
willfulness even after Seagate. See, e.g., Presidio 
Components Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 723 
F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1324 (S.D. Cal. 2010), aff'd in 
relevant part, 702 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
“[W]illfully infringed” in § 298 only makes sense if it 
refers to the standard for increasing damages under 
§ 284. 
II. The Federal Circuit’s Current Two-Part Test 
for Determining Willfulness Is Incorrect as a 
Matter of Law 
Until 2007, the issue of willful patent 
infringement was “a factual determination to be 
made after consideration of the totality of the 
circumstances.” Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g 
Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1993). On appeal, 
the Federal Circuit reviewed the “determination of 
willfulness under a clearly erroneous standard.” Id. 
But in Seagate, the Federal Circuit, sitting en 
banc, substantially reshaped the legal standard for 
establishing willfulness. Responding to arguments 
that its prior jurisprudence set too low a bar for 
finding willfulness,7 the Federal Circuit announced 
                                                 
7 In particular, the Federal Circuit concluded in Seagate 
that the so-called “affirmative duty of due care” articulated in 
Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 
1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983), which required a potential infringer with 
notice of another’s patent rights to exercise due care—most 
commonly by obtaining the advice of competent legal counsel 









that a patentee must make “at least a showing of 
objective recklessness” by the accused infringer. 
Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. It then articulated a two-
part test for this showing: 
[T]o establish willful infringement, a patentee 
must show by clear and convincing evidence 
that the infringer acted despite an objectively 
high likelihood that its actions constituted 
infringement of a valid patent. The state of 
mind of the accused infringer is not relevant to 
this objective inquiry. If this threshold 
objective standard is satisfied, the patentee 
must also demonstrate that this objectively-
defined risk . . . was either known or so 
obvious that it should have been known to the 
accused infringer. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). In Bard Peripheral 
Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Associates, 682 F.3d 
1003 (Fed. Cir. 2012), the en banc Federal Circuit 
held that the first part of the Seagate test—the so-
called objective prong—was “best decided by the 
judge as a question of law subject to de novo review,” 
                                                                                                    
akin to negligence” than willfulness and thus overruled it. 
Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1370-71. Amici agree that a negligence-
like standard is inappropriate for determining willfulness and 
that a showing of at least recklessness is required under § 284. 
However, amici contend this showing should be made under a 
totality of the circumstances, rather than the rigid test 








even though this inquiry often involves underlying 
factual issues.8 Id. at 1007. 
For the reasons described below, the Federal 
Circuit’s current rigid two-part test for determining 
willfulness (and thus eligibility for increased 
damages) under § 284 should be rejected in favor of a 
flexible, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry.  
A. The Pre-Seagate Approach to 
Willfulness Was a Flexible Inquiry 
For nearly 25 years prior to its decision in 
Seagate, the Federal Circuit employed a flexible, 
totality-of-the-circumstances approach in deciding 
whether an infringer’s conduct was willful. As one 
decision put it: 
In determining whether willfulness has been 
shown, we look to the totality of the 
circumstances, understanding that willfulness, 
as in life, is not an all-or-nothing trait, but one 
of degree. It recognizes that infringement may 
range from unknowing, or accidental, to 
deliberate, or reckless, disregard of the 
patentee’s legal rights. 
Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 
1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and 
citation omitted)); see also Rolls–Royce Ltd., v. GTE 
                                                 
8 The majority opinion in Bard noted that the objective 
reasonableness inquiry was a question of law, even when the 
asserted defenses that allegedly rendered the infringer’s 
conduct reasonable involved questions of fact, such as 








Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1110 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(“In respect of willfulness, there cannot be hard and 
fast per se rules.”). This inquiry “include[d] 
subjective as well as objective elements,” Pall Corp. 
v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1221 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995), such as “the closeness or complexity of 
the legal and factual questions presented”; whether 
the infringer had engaged in copying of the 
patentee’s product, or alternatively whether it had 
“attempt[ed] to design around and avoid the patent”; 
whether the infringer “relied on legal advice”; and 
“any other factors tending to show good faith” by the 
infringer. SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., 
Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  
B. The Federal Circuit’s Current Two-Part 
Test for Evaluating Willfulness Is 
Fatally Flawed  
The Federal Circuit abandoned this flexible 
approach by adopting the rigid, two-part test first 
articulated in Seagate and further elaborated upon 
in Bard. As explained below, this test is fatally 
flawed because it is “overly rigid” and too “inflexible” 
for the discretionary inquiry mandated by § 284. 
Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756-57. 
1. The Federal Circuit’s Rigid Test for 
Willfulness Is Similar to the Two-
Part Test for Attorney’s Fees 
Rejected in Octane Fitness 
In Octane Fitness, this Court rejected a similar 
two-part, objective/subjective test for attorney’s fees 
pursuant to § 285 of the Patent Act. Id. at 1749. As 








employed a flexible, totality-of-the-circumstances 
standard for determining eligibility for attorney’s 
fees in patent cases. Id. at 1754. Indeed, the Federal 
Circuit often considered attorney’s fees under § 285 
hand-in-hand with willful infringement under § 284, 
affirming fee awards based at least in part on a 
finding of willfulness. See, e.g., Kori Corp. v. Wilco 
Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 656–
57 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (willful infringement found; 
double damages and attorney fees awarded); 
Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 
F.2d 1540, 1547–48 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (willful 
infringement found; treble damages and attorney 
fees awarded); see also Imonex Servs., Inc. v. W.H. 
Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GmbH, 408 F.3d 1374, 
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The criteria for declaring a 
case exceptional [under § 285] include willful 
infringement . . . .”). 
In Brooks Furniture Manufacturing, Inc. v. 
Dutailier International, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005), however, the Federal Circuit “abandoned 
that holistic, equitable approach in favor of a more 
rigid and mechanical formulation” for determining 
exceptionality under § 285. Octane Fitness, 134 S. 
Ct. at 1754. Specifically, Brooks Furniture 
articulated a two-part test requiring the prevailing 
party to prove the litigation was both (1) objectively 
baseless and (2) brought in subjective bad faith. 393 
F.3d at 1381. This Court unanimously rejected the 
Brooks Furniture test as “unduly rigid” and 
“impermissibly encumber[ing] the statutory grant of 
discretion” by dramatically circumscribing the 
district court’s discretion for awarding attorney’s 








Here, the Federal Circuit similarly erred in 
adopting a rigid, two-part, objective/subjective test 
for determining willfulness under § 284. Indeed, the 
Federal Circuit itself has declared that the two-part 
test for “objective baselessness . . . under Brooks 
Furniture is identical to the objective recklessness 
standard . . . for § 284 willful infringement actions 
under [Seagate].” iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 
F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011). It has also 
emphasized that, like Brooks Furniture, evidence of 
the infringer’s state of mind “is irrelevant to the 
objective baselessness inquiry” required by the first 
part of the test. iLOR, 631 F.3d at 1377-78. And like 
Brooks Furniture, this inflexible approach is 
contrary to the statutory language of § 284, which 
allocates significant discretion to the trial court. 
Compare 35 U.S.C. § 284 (“[T]he court may increase 
damages up to three times the amount found or 
assessed.” (emphasis added)), with id. § 285 (“The 
court in exceptional cases may award attorney fees 
to the prevailing party.” (emphasis added)). 
2. The Objective Prong Is an Overly 
Strict Gatekeeper to the Willfulness 
Inquiry 
In addition to its inflexible nature, the objective 
prong of the two-part test operates as an overly strict 
gatekeeper to the willfulness inquiry, as many 
claims of willfulness never proceed beyond this 
threshold determination. 
The Federal Circuit has held that the existence of 
a “reasonable” or “substantial” but ultimately 
unsuccessful defense to an infringement claim 








thus the willfulness inquiry must be terminated. 
See, e.g., Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore 
& Assocs., Inc., 776 F.3d 837, 844 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(“Objective recklessness will not be found where the 
accused infringer has raised a substantial question 
as to the validity or noninfringement of the patent.” 
(internal quotations and citation omitted)); Spine 
Sols., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 
620 F.3d 1305, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Th[e] 
‘objective’ prong of Seagate tends not to be met 
where an accused infringer relies on a reasonable 
defense to a charge of infringement.”). This extends 
not just to potential defenses known to the infringer 
prior to engaging in infringing conduct (such as 
those developed in an opinion of counsel), but to 
defenses first discovered during the pendency of 
litigation as well. See, e.g., Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. 
Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., No. 2014-1492, 2015 WL 
4639309, at *14 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 4, 2015) (“[W]e have 
repeatedly assessed [the] objective reasonableness of 
a defense without requiring that the litigation had 
the defense in mind before the litigation.”), petition 
for reh’g en banc held in abeyance, 805 F.3d 1382 
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 17, 2015) (per curiam); Glob. Traffic 
Techs. LLC v. Morgan, No. 2014-1537, 2015 WL 
3513416, at *7 (Fed. Cir. June 4, 2015) (explaining 
the objective prong “requires analysis of all of the 
infringer’s non-infringement and invalidity defenses, 
even if those defenses were developed for litigation”); 
see also Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 
F.3d 1371, 1381–83 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
As a result, willfulness often “turns not on an 
evaluation of the risk of infringement at the time the 








whether or not an omniscient accused infringer 
would have recognized it had a viable defense.” 
Jason Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in 
Patent Infringement, 60 Am. U. L. Rev. 1575, 1628-
29 (2011). Because skilled litigation counsel can 
usually articulate at least one reasonable defense to 
an infringement claim,9 the Federal Circuit’s 
omniscient view of objective reasonableness sets a 
high bar. Indeed, one empirical study of district 
court decisions on willfulness after Seagate found 
that the existence of a “substantial” or “legitimate” 
defense was “the single best way to defeat a 
willfulness claim.” See Christopher B. Seaman, 
Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages 
After In re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 Iowa L. 
Rev. 417, 452 tbl.5, 457 (2012). 
The Federal Circuit also has held that the 
objective prong must be proven by “clear and 
convincing evidence,” Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371, 
even though this is an evidentiary standard that 
“applies to questions of fact and not to questions of 
                                                 
9 In addition to non-infringement, the most common 
defenses raised in patent litigation are lack of patentable 
subject matter, anticipation/lack of novelty, obviousness, 
indefiniteness, lack of enablement, and inadequate written 
description. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. 
Schwartz, Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent 
Litigation, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 1769, 1785 tbl.2 (2014). Other 
potential defenses include inequitable conduct, laches, 
equitable estoppel, contractual estoppel, license, co-ownership, 
patent misuse, sovereign immunity, the reverse doctrine of 
equivalents, and prior commercial use. See Patent Litigation 
Strategies Handbook 1282-87, 1294-1322 (Barry L. Grossman 








law,” Microsoft Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2253 (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 
423 (1979)), thus further raising the bar for 
satisfying this requirement. In addition, the Federal 
Circuit’s reclassification of the first part of the 
willfulness inquiry as a question of law, see Bard, 
682 F.3d at 1007, grants it de novo review over this 
issue, which it has repeatedly used to overturn 
findings of willfulness on appeal. See, e.g., Carnegie 
Mellon Univ., 2015 WL 4639309, at *12-15; Glob. 
Traffic Techs. LLC, 2015 WL 3513416, at *8; 
Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 611 F. 
App’x 693, 700-01 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Stryker Corp. v. 
Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649, 660-62 (Fed. Cir. 2015); 
Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Varian Med. Sys., Inc., 561 F. 
App’x 934, 943-45 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Lee v. Mike’s 
Novelties, Inc., 543 F. App’x 1010, 1016-17 (Fed. Cir. 
2013); Harris Corp. v. Fed. Express Corp., 502 F. 
App’x 957, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Bard, 682 F.3d at 
1005-08; Spine Sols., Inc., 620 F.3d at 1320. In sum, 
the Federal Circuit’s application of the objective 
prong of Seagate has effectively elevated a single 
factor—the existence of a reasonable litigation 
defense to infringement—and made it dispositive of 
the entire willfulness inquiry in most cases. 
3. The Federal Circuit’s Erroneous 
Two-Part Test Often Excludes Key 
Evidence Regarding an Infringer’s 
State of Mind 
 The Federal Circuit’s two-part test for 
willfulness is further flawed because it prohibits 
consideration of the infringer’s state of mind until 








Under the current standard, “the state of mind of the 
accused infringer is not relevant” to determining 
objective reasonableness. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371; 
see also Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 
1221, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Should the court 
determine that the infringer’s reliance on a defense 
was not objectively reckless, it cannot send the 
question of willfulness to the jury, since proving the 
objective prong is a predicate to consideration of the 
subjective prong.”). 
By artificially bifurcating the willfulness inquiry 
into separate objective and subjective prongs 
evaluated by different decisionmakers (judge and 
jury, respectively), the Federal Circuit’s rigid two-
part test often precludes consideration of highly 
probative evidence regarding the infringer’s intent, 
such as copying.10 For example, in DePuy Spine, Inc. 
v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314 
(Fed. Cir. 2009), the patentee argued that the 
infringer had knowingly copied its patented 
invention and that this was material evidence of 
willfulness. Id. at 1336. The Federal Circuit rejected 
                                                 
10 Empirical studies have found a strong relationship 
between evidence of copying and willful infringement. See 
Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent 
Law, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1421, 1455 (2009) (finding in study of 
district court decisions involving willfulness from January 2006 
through February 2008 that “successful proof of copying 
overwhelmingly leads to a finding of willfulness”); Seaman, 
supra, at 458 (finding in study of district court decisions on 
willfulness from Seagate through August 2010 that willfulness 
was found 63% of the time when the patentee offered evidence 
of copying by the accused infringer, compared to 29% of the 








this claim, concluding that evidence of copying was 
“not relevant to the objective inquiry under Seagate’s 
first prong.” Id.; see also id. at 1337 (holding that 
“DePuy’s arguments concerning ‘copying’ . . . are 
relevant only to Medtronic’s mental state regarding 
its direct infringement under Seagate’s second 
prong”). And because it found that the patentee had 
articulated a substantial (but losing) defense of non-
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, it 
affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment as a 
matter of law that overturned the jury’s finding of 
willfulness. Id. at 1335-37.  
In contrast, pre-Seagate case law frequently 
relied on a finding of copying to support willfulness. 
See, e.g., Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, 
Inc., 96 F.3d 1409, 1414 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (affirming 
finding of willful infringement based in part on 
evidence that the infringer had “deliberately copied 
the ideas or design of the [asserted] patent”); Milgo 
Elec. Corp. v. United Bus. Commc’ns, Inc., 623 F.2d 
645, 666 (10th Cir. 1980) (“Many courts have held 
that faithful copying of a patented product shows an 
intentional disregard for the patent owner's rights 
and supports an award of increased damages under 
[§ 284].”). Indeed, some scholars have argued that 
the purpose of willfulness is to deter intentional 
copying. See, e.g., Lemley & Tangri, supra, at 1118 
(“Willfulness law is designed to deter unscrupulous 
copyists from taking advantage of the patent 
disclosure in order to copy the patentee’s invention 
and rush it to market.”). And evidence of copying is 
relevant to other issues of liability, such as 
inducement of infringement. See Global-Tech 








(2011). In short, it inconsistent with the flexible 
inquiry mandated by § 284 to decide the issue of 
willfulness without considering evidence regarding 
the infringer’s state of mind. 
III. Willfulness Should Be Determined Under the 
Totality of the Circumstances  
In lieu of the rigid, two-part test articulated by 
the Federal Circuit in Seagate and its progeny, this 
Court should conclude the correct test for willfulness 
is a determination that the infringer has at least 
recklessly violated the patentee’s rights under a 
totality of the circumstances.11 This approach is 
faithful to both the text of § 284 and historical 
practice. On appeal, the lower court’s decision should 
be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Finally, a 
totality-of-the-circumstances approach to willfulness 
will not result in a parade of horribles, such as 
jeopardizing attorney-client privilege or a dramatic 
increase in treble damage awards. 
A. The Statutory Text and Historical 
Practice Favor a Totality-of-the-
Circumstances Approach 
This Court should hold that willfulness should be 
determined under the totality of the circumstances. 
As previously explained, since 1836, patent law has 
granted discretion to the trial court whether and 
how much to increase damages due to willfulness. 
                                                 
11 In amici’s view, reckless violations of a patentee’s rights 









See supra pp. 3-16. The current version of the 
increased damages provision, § 284, similarly grants 
discretion by stating that “the court may increase 
the damages up to three times the amount found or 
assessed.” 35 U.S.C. § 284 (emphasis added). Use of 
“‘the word ‘may’ clearly connotes discretion.’” Martin 
v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 136 (2005) 
(quoting Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 533). The only textual 
limitation on the trial court’s discretion is that 
increased damages “shall not apply to provisional 
rights under [§] 154(d).” 35 U.S.C. § 284. 
In Octane Fitness, this Court interpreted similar 
discretionary language in § 285 to require that 
district courts apply a “totality of the circumstances” 
test in determining whether a case is “exceptional.” 
Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756. A similar 
construction should apply to § 284, particularly since 
both statutory provisions serve a common objective—
the deterrence of willful infringement. See Mathis v. 
Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(“Provisions for increased damages under 35 U.S.C. § 
284 and attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 are 
available as deterrents to blatant, blind, willful 
infringement of valid patents.”); see also Knorr-
Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1343 (stating that the “[r]emedy 
for willful infringement is founded on 35 U.S.C. 
§ 284 . . . and 35 U.S.C. § 285”). 
A totality-of-the-circumstances test for 
determining willfulness also is consistent with prior 
case law. As previously discussed, courts routinely 
considered the totality of the circumstances in 









B. The District Court’s Decision Should Be 
Reviewed for Abuse of Discretion on 
Appeal 
In addition, the Court should conclude that the 
district court’s decision regarding increased damages 
for willfulness should be evaluated for abuse of 
discretion on appeal, rather than de novo review. As 
discussed above, the statutory text of § 284 grants 
discretion to the district court regarding whether to 
increase damages for willfulness. In Highmark Inc. 
v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 1744 (2014)—decided the same day as Octane 
Fitness—the Court held that similar discretionary 
language in § 285 should be “reviewed on appeal for 
abuse of discretion.” Id. at 1748. Like in Highmark, 
the text of § 284 “‘emphasizes the fact that the 
determination is for the district court,’ which 
‘suggests some deference to the district court upon 
appeal.’” Id. (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 
552, 599 (1988)). 
A deferential standard of review on appeal also 
makes logical sense in light of the highly fact-specific 
nature of the willfulness inquiry. As the Federal 
Circuit explained pre-Seagate, willfulness is 
primarily “a question of fact, for it includes elements 
of intent, reasonableness, and belief” that are 
particularly within the province of the trial court. 
Pall Corp., 66 F.3d at 1221; see also SRI Int’l, Inc., 
127 F.3d at 1465 (“Since the issue of willfulness not 
only raises issues of reasonableness and prudence, 
but is often accompanied by questions of intent, 
belief, and credibility, appellate review requires 








court in making such determinations.”). In addition, 
this Court has held that punitive damages should be 
reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard on 
appeal “[i]f no constitutional issue is raised,” such as 
when the relevant statute “place[s] limits on the 
permissible size” of such awards. Cooper Indus., Inc. 
v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433 
(2001). As a result, “an appellate court should apply 
an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all 
aspects of a district court’s” § 284 determination. 
Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1749. 
C. A Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test 
Will Not Adversely Impact Attorney-
Client Privilege  
One potential concern regarding a totality-of-the-
circumstances test is that it may adversely impact 
attorney-client privilege by coercing accused 
infringers to obtain and disclose an opinion of 
counsel to defend against willfulness, thus waiving 
the privilege. See, e.g., William F. Lee & Lawrence 
P. Cogswell, III, Understanding and Addressing the 
Unfair Dilemma Created by the Doctrine of Willful 
Patent Infringement, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 393, 433-34 
(2004) (labelling the “infringer’s dilemma” the choice 
“to invoke the advice-of-counsel defense, thereby 
waiving privilege or immunity or both, or choose not 
to produce an opinion letter, thereby maintaining a 
full panoply of privileges and immunities”). But this 
is not likely to occur for at least three reasons. 
First, in Knorr-Bremse, the Federal Circuit 
rejected the so-called “adverse inference” rule, which 
previously permitted the decisionmaker on 








culpability based on an accused infringer’s failure to 
obtain or offer an opinion of counsel in its defense at 
trial. 383 F.3d at 1344-46. This holding was 
subsequently codified by Congress. See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 298.12 As a result, an accused infringer’s decision to 
maintain privilege and not offer an opinion of 
counsel cannot be used against it, even under a 
totality-of-the-circumstances approach.  
Second, in Seagate, the Federal Circuit held that 
any waiver of attorney-client privilege (as well as 
work product protection) due to disclosure of an 
opinion of counsel ordinarily will not extend to trial 
counsel. 497 F.3d at 1373-74. This remains good law 
even if Seagate’s rigid two-part test is overturned by 
this Court.  
Third, despite the “widespread perception that 
opinions of counsel remain a strong defense against 
willfulness charges,” empirical evidence rebuts this 
claim. Seaman, supra, at 454. One study of district 
court decisions in the three years following Seagate 
found nearly identical rates of willful infringement 
findings in cases where infringers offered an opinion 
of counsel and in cases they did not. Id. As a result, 
the incentive of accused infringers to disclose an 
opinion of counsel is much weakened. 
                                                 
12 This provision is effective for all patent litigation that 
commenced on or after January 14, 2013. Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act Technical Corrections § 1(a), Pub. L. No. 








D. A Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test 
Will Not Result in a Dramatic Increase 
in Treble Damage Awards 
Finally, a totality-of-the-circumstances approach 
for determining willfulness will not lead to a 
dramatic increase in treble damage awards. First, 
even if the rigid, two-part test announced in Seagate 
is replaced with a totality-of-the-circumstances 
inquiry, the underlying requirement for increasing 
damages under § 284—willfulness—remains intact. 
As this Court has held in other civil contexts, a 
showing of at least reckless misconduct is required 
to establish willfulness. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of 
Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 (2007) (concluding that 
the “standard civil usage” of “willful” under the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act includes reckless violations); 
McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 132-
33 (1988) (concluding that willful violations of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act include reckless 
violations). As a result, lower courts cannot return to 
a negligence-like standard for awarding increased 
damages. See Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1370-71.  
Second, even if willfulness is established, the 
district court retains discretion whether to increase 
damages and how much damages should be 
increased, up to the statutory maximum of treble 
damages. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (stating that “the court 
may increase the damages up to three times the 
amount found or assessed” (emphasis added)); see 
also Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (“An award of enhanced damages for 
infringement, as well as the extent of the 








trial court.”). Empirical studies have found that even 
when a district court decides to increase damages for 
willfulness under § 284, it awards the maximum of 
triple damages substantially less than half of the 
time. See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and 
Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black 
Box, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 365, 367, 394 (2000) (finding in 
study of all patent cases that went to trial from 
1983-1999 that damages were tripled only 35% of 
the time when the district court increased damages 
under § 284 and the average enhancement was less 
than double damages); Seaman, supra, at 469 
(finding in study of district court decisions from 
September 2004 through July 2010 that over 70% of 
increased damages awards under § 284 were for 
double damages or less). This suggests that triple 
damages are generally awarded only in egregious 
cases of willfulness. See Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 826 
(“The paramount determination in deciding to grant 
enhancement and the amount thereof is the 
egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct based on all 
the facts and circumstances.”). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should 
reverse the Federal Circuit in both cases on the issue 
of willfulness, hold that the appropriate standard 
under § 284 is a showing that the infringer willfully 
infringed under the totality of the circumstances and 
that this determination is to be reviewed for abuse of 
discretion on appeal, and remand to the district 











CHRISTOPHER B. SEAMAN 
Counsel of Record 
Washington and Lee 
University School of Law 
1 Denny Circle 





University of Iowa  
  College of Law 
280 Boyd Law Building 
Melrose & Byington 





APPENDIX – LIST OF SIGNATORIES 
Timothy R. Holbrook 
Professor of Law 
Emory University School of Law 
Jason Rantanen 
Associate Professor of Law 
University of Iowa College of Law 
Christopher B. Seaman 
Associate Professor of Law 
Washington and Lee University School of Law 
 The views expressed in this brief are those of the
individual signatories and not those of the institutions with 
which they are affiliated. 
